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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
In this consolidated appeal, defendants Mohamad 
Shnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka, and Serdar 
Tatar appeal various aspects of the convictions and sentences 
they received after a high-profile, two-and-a-half-month jury 
trial concerning a plot to attack United States military bases 
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, particularly the 
United States Army Base at Fort Dix.  The government 
presented extensive evidence of the plot, including:  dozens 
of recorded conversations among defendants and two 
confidential informants discussing violent jihad and plans to 
stage an attack; weeks of testimony from the government‟s 
confidential informants and the law enforcement agents who 
coordinated the government‟s sixteen-month investigation; 
videos of defendants‟ “training” trips in the Poconos, where 
they engaged in target practice; propaganda videos 
advocating violent jihad, including attacks against American 
service members, which defendants viewed and discussed; 
and video surveillance of a transaction in which two 
defendants purchased automatic and semi-automatic weapons 
for use in an attack.  All defendants were convicted of 
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conspiring to murder United States military personnel in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1117.  Four of the five 
defendants were also convicted of various firearm offenses. 
Defendants raise numerous arguments on appeal.  
Most significantly, they urge that (1) their convictions should 
be reversed because they were based in part on evidence 
procured under a purportedly unconstitutional provision of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and (2) the 
District Court improperly admitted certain out-of-court 
statements against Serdar Tatar under the coconspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule.  In a joint, counseled brief and 
individual briefs that we permitted them to file pro se, 
defendants also raise a number of evidentiary and other issues 
concerning the conduct of their trial.  Because we conclude 
that their arguments lack merit and that Judge Kugler 
managed this extraordinarily complex trial in an exemplary 
way, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgments as to the 
conspiracy and most of the firearm offenses.  For reasons we 
discuss in more detail below, we will vacate Mohamed 
Shnewer‟s conviction on Count 4, attempted possession of 
firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
I. 
Shnewer, the Duka brothers, and Tatar are a group of 
young men who lived in New Jersey and developed an 
interest in violent jihad, particularly attacks against the United 
States military.  Defendants, who had known each other since 
high school, came to the FBI‟s attention after it received a 
copy of a video that was brought to a Circuit City store in Mt. 
Laurel, New Jersey, for copying.  The video dated from 
January 2006 and depicted the five defendants and others at a 
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firing range in the Pocono Mountains, shooting weapons and 
shouting “Allah Akbar!” and “jihad in the States.” 
Over the course of the next sixteen months, the FBI 
deployed two cooperating witnesses, Mahmoud Omar and 
Besnik Bakalli, to monitor defendants‟ activities.  The 
evidence presented at trial showed that, between January 
2006 and May 2007, defendants viewed and shared videos of 
violent jihadist activities, including beheadings, around the 
world; they viewed and shared videos of lectures advocating 
violent jihad against non-Muslims; they sought to acquire 
numerous weapons, including automatic firearms and rocket-
propelled grenades; they returned to the Poconos, where they 
again engaged in shooting practice; they discussed plans to 
attack the United States military; they conducted research and 
surveillance on various potential targets for such an attack in 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; and they procured 
a map of the United States Army Base at Fort Dix to use in 
planning and coordinating such an attack.   
With respect to the individual defendants, the evidence 
demonstrated the following: 
Mohamed Shnewer is a naturalized American citizen 
who was born in Jordan.  He admired and sought to emulate 
the “nineteen brothers,” i.e., the September 11 hijackers, 
Osama bin Laden, and the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi.  Shnewer openly discussed and planned 
attacks on military targets in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Delaware.  Along with Omar, the government informant, he 
staked out the United States Army Base at Fort Dix, McGuire 
Air Force Base, Lakehurst Naval Air Station, and the United 
States Army Base at Fort Monmouth in New Jersey; the 
United States Coast Guard Base in Philadelphia, 
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Pennsylvania; and Dover Air Force Base in Delaware.  
Shnewer also considered attacking the federal government 
building at 6th and Arch Streets in Philadelphia and drove by 
the building to determine whether such an attack would be 
feasible.  To accomplish an attack on these targets, Shnewer 
proposed deploying a gas tanker truck as a bomb, using 
roadside bombs or surface-to-air missiles, and spraying 
military targets with machinegun fire.  He sought to acquire 
AK-47 machineguns from Omar to use in such an attack. 
Dritan, Shain, and Eljvir Duka are brothers who were 
born in Albania.  During the events that were the subject of 
the trial, they were in the United States illegally.  In 2006 and 
2007, the Dukas took at least two trips to the Poconos to train 
for jihad by firing weapons, attempting to buy automatic 
weapons, discussing jihad, and watching violent jihadist 
videos.  The Dukas befriended government informant Bakalli, 
a fellow Albanian, and encouraged him to join them in 
avenging Muslims who had been oppressed by the United 
States and Israel.  They viewed and praised a lecture, 
Constants on the Path to Jihad, by Anwar al-Awlaki, the 
prominent cleric and proponent of attacks against the United 
States military, and videos depicting attacks on American 
soldiers by violent jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere.  In 
recorded conversations presented at trial, the Dukas described 
beheadings depicted in the videos as just punishment for 
traitors.  The Dukas watched the beheading videos over and 
over again until they became inured to the spectacle.  Dritan 
told Bakalli that, although at first he “couldn‟t take it,” 
“[n]ow I see it and it‟s nothing, I do not care.  I saw hundreds 
being beheaded.”  Similarly, Eljvir told Bakalli that the 
beheadings were difficult to watch at first, but that “[n]ow we 
can watch it no problem.”   
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Like Shnewer, the Dukas sought to acquire firearms to 
further their plans.  They could not acquire weapons lawfully 
because they were in the country illegally, so they turned to 
the black market.  By January 2007, the three brothers told 
Bakalli they had acquired a shotgun, two semi-automatic 
rifles, and a pistol, and they continued to look for 
opportunities to buy machineguns.   
Later that spring, Dritan Duka ordered nine fully 
automatic weapons — AK-47s and M-16s — from a contact 
of Omar‟s in Baltimore.  The FBI arranged a controlled 
transaction, and, on May 7, 2007, Dritan and Shain Duka 
went to Omar‟s apartment to retrieve their weapons.  After 
handing Omar $1,400 in cash, Dritan and Shain examined and 
handled four fully automatic machineguns and three semi-
automatic assault rifles.  They asked Omar for garbage bags 
to conceal the weapons (so they would look like golf clubs) as 
they carried them out to the car.  Before they could get there, 
however, federal and state law enforcement officers entered 
Omar‟s apartment and arrested them.  The entire transaction 
was captured on video by equipment installed in Omar‟s 
apartment by the FBI and was shown to the jury at trial. 
Serdar Tatar is a lawful permanent resident in the 
United States who was born in Turkey.  Tatar appears in the 
video of defendants‟ January 2006 training trip to the 
Poconos.  After extensive discussions with Omar about 
Shnewer‟s plan to attack Fort Dix, Tatar agreed to help by 
providing Omar with a map of Fort Dix to use in planning 
such an attack.  Regarding the overall plan to attack Fort Dix, 
Tatar told Omar in a recorded conversation, “I‟m in, honestly, 
I‟m in.”   
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All five defendants were arrested on May 7, 2007, 
after Dritan and Shain Duka completed the controlled firearm 
purchase from Omar.  A superseding indictment, filed on 
January 15, 2008, charged defendants with: 
 Count 1:  conspiracy to murder members of the 
United States military, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1114 & 1117 (all defendants);  
 Count 2:  attempt to murder members of the 
United States military, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1114 (all defendants);  
 Count 3:  possession or attempted possession 
of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 
924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Dritan, Eljvir, and Shain 
Duka);  
 Count 4:  attempted possession of firearms in 
furtherance of a crime of violence in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 
924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Shnewer);  
 Count 5:  possession of machineguns in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (Dritan and 
Shain Duka); and  
 Counts 6 and 7:  possession of firearms by an 
illegal alien in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(5) (Dritan and Shain Duka (2 counts); 
Eljvir Duka (1 count)). 
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Defendants pleaded not guilty to all charges.  After a 
two-and-a-half-month jury trial, they were convicted and 
sentenced as follows: 
 
Defendant Convictions Sentence
1
 
Shnewer  Conspiracy to murder 
members of the U.S. 
military 
 Attempted possession 
of firearms in 
furtherance of a crime 
of violence 
 Life 
 
 
 360 months, to 
run 
consecutively 
                                                 
1  Unless otherwise noted, sentences on different counts run 
concurrently with one another. 
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Defendant Convictions Sentence
1
 
Dritan Duka  Conspiracy to murder 
members of the U.S. 
military 
 Possession or 
attempted possession 
of firearms in 
furtherance of a crime 
of violence 
 Possession of 
machineguns 
 Possession of firearms 
by an illegal alien (two 
counts) 
 Life 
 
 
 360 months, to 
run 
consecutively 
 
 
 120 months 
 
 120 months 
for each count 
Eljvir Duka  Conspiracy to murder 
members of the U.S. 
military 
 Possession of firearms 
by an illegal alien (one 
count) 
 Life 
 
 
 120 months 
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Defendant Convictions Sentence
1
 
Shain Duka  Conspiracy to murder 
members of the U.S. 
military 
 Possession or 
attempted possession 
of firearms in 
furtherance of a crime 
of violence 
 Possession of 
machineguns 
 Possession of firearms 
by an illegal alien (two 
counts) 
 Life 
 
 
 360 months, to 
run 
consecutively 
 
 
 120 months 
 
 120 months on 
each count 
Tatar  Conspiracy to murder 
members of the U.S. 
military 
 396 months 
 
Defendants timely appealed the judgments entered 
against them.  We have jurisdiction to review their 
convictions and sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742, respectively. 
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II. 
A.  Defendants’ FISA Challenge 
Defendants challenge their convictions on the ground 
that the government‟s case was tainted by its reliance on 
evidence procured pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, or FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as 
amended by the 2001 Patriot Act.
2
  The Patriot Act revised a 
provision of FISA, 18 U.S.C. § 1804, to require a national 
security officer to certify that “a significant purpose,” rather 
than “the purpose,” of surveillance the officer seeks to 
conduct under FISA is “to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.”  Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2008) 
with 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000).  Before the Patriot 
Act amendment, courts routinely interpreted that provision to 
require certification that foreign intelligence collection was 
the “primary purpose” of a FISA search.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The 
requirement that foreign intelligence information be the 
primary objective of the surveillance is plain . . . from the 
requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must 
contain.”).   
Defendants contend that FISA, as amended by the 
Patriot Act, violates the Fourth Amendment in two ways.  
They urge that FISA‟s post-Patriot Act “significant purpose” 
test does not appropriately balance individual privacy 
interests against the government‟s interests in foreign 
                                                 
2
  The Patriot Act‟s full name is the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
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intelligence gathering and, therefore, is unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Defendants also argue that FISA 
unconstitutionally authorizes the government to conduct 
searches for criminal prosecution purposes that do not satisfy 
typical Fourth Amendment requirements.  Most significantly, 
they complain that “[t]he requirements under FISA do not 
include probable cause of a crime being committed.”3  
Appellants‟ Opening Br. 58. 
Defendants maintain that we must reverse their 
convictions because the government used unlawful FISA-
                                                 
3  Defendants also briefly assert that FISA does not satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment‟s neutral magistrate, notification, and 
particularity requirements.  We agree with the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that these 
arguments do not preclude a determination that amended 
FISA is constitutional.  See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 
738 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) 
(“[T]here is no dispute that a FISA judge satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment‟s requirement of a „neutral and detached 
magistrate.‟”); see also id. at 739-40 (under FISA, executive 
officers must identify with particularity the type of foreign 
intelligence information sought and facts establishing 
probable cause to believe that facilities or places at which 
surveillance is directed are being used, or are about to be 
used, by a foreign power and that the target of the 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power); id. at 741 (FISA requires notice to defendant that 
evidence obtained through FISA surveillance will be used in a 
criminal proceeding). 
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derived evidence throughout the trial;
4
 the FISA-derived 
evidence resulted in their convictions; and, without that 
evidence, the government cannot prove the charges against 
them. 
Aligning with all of the other courts of appeals that 
have considered this issue, however, we reject defendants‟ 
constitutional challenge.  We conclude that FISA‟s amended 
“significant purpose” requirement is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, that the government‟s use 
of FISA-derived evidence in its case against defendants was 
lawful.  We also observe that, even if we were to hold the 
statute unconstitutional, defendants still would not be entitled 
to have their convictions reversed.  Defendants‟ argument for 
reversal depends on the assumption that, if FISA is declared 
unconstitutional, then the exclusionary rule would preclude 
                                                 
4  The scope and nature of the FISA-derived evidence 
presented at trial appear to be limited.  Defendants do not 
identify which specific pieces of evidence were obtained 
through FISA surveillance, but the government informed us 
in its brief that, of all the evidence presented at trial, only two 
recorded conversations were obtained through FISA 
surveillance.  On the eve of oral argument, the government 
notified us that it also presented several FISA-derived 
photographs at trial.  Assuming the government now has 
provided us with a complete accounting of the FISA-derived 
evidence used in the case, we conclude that it was de minimis, 
both in terms of the overall volume of evidence presented at 
the trial and of its probative value.  Because we cannot be 
certain that the government has identified all of the FISA-
derived evidence it used, however, we do not base our 
disposition on this conclusion. 
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the use of FISA-derived evidence in their case.  Not so.  
Where, as here, the challenged search was conducted in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a duly authorized statute, 
the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does 
not preclude the admission of the fruits of the search.
5
 
 1.  FISA and the Fourth Amendment 
 a.  Statutory Background and Structure 
FISA, as originally enacted in 1978, empowered the 
Chief Justice of the United States to establish a special court 
(now known as the FISA court), staffed by district court 
judges, with “jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant 
orders approving electronic surveillance” related to foreign 
intelligence.  50 U.S.C. § 1803.  As relevant here,  
[FISA] authorizes a judge on the 
FISA court to grant an application 
for an order approving electronic 
surveillance to “obtain foreign 
intelligence information” if “there 
is probable cause to believe 
                                                 
5
  Although the challenged evidence would stand even if FISA 
was unconstitutional, we have nevertheless undertaken a 
thorough analysis of the defendants‟ Fourth Amendment 
claim because of the importance of the issues it raises.  See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (“If the 
resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is 
necessary to guide future action by law enforcement 
officers . . . , nothing will prevent reviewing courts from 
deciding that question before turning to the good faith 
issue.”). 
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that . . . the target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power,” and 
that “each of the facilities or 
places at which the surveillance is 
directed is being used, or is about 
to be used, by a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power.”   
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)).  
Among other things, the statute defines a “foreign power” as 
“a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor,” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4), and an “agent 
of a foreign power” as (a) a non-“United States person” (i.e., 
non-U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident) who “engages 
in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore 
[sic],” id. § 1081(b)(1)(C); see also id. § 1801(i) (defining 
“United States person”), or (b) “any person” who “knowingly 
engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities 
that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign 
power,” id. § 1801(b)(2)(C), (i).6 
The relevant provision in this case, 50 U.S.C. § 1804, 
“sets forth the elements of an application for [such] an order.”  
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723.  The original version of § 1804 
“required a national security official in the Executive 
Branch — typically the Director of the FBI — to certify that 
„the purpose‟ of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
                                                 
6  On appeal, defendants do not argue that the government 
failed to satisfy these statutory requirements or assert any 
procedural irregularity in obtaining or executing the FISA 
orders that generated the evidence used in this case. 
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intelligence information.”  Id. (quoting former 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1804(a)(7)(B)).  In 2001, as part of the Patriot Act, 
Congress revised that requirement so that it now requires the 
official to certify “that a significant purpose of the 
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.”  50 
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (emphasis added).   
                              b.  The Fourth Amendment’s                            
Reasonableness Requirement 
At its most basic level, defendants‟ argument is that 
FISA‟s “significant purpose” standard is unconstitutional 
because it allows the government to conduct electronic 
surveillance upon a lesser showing than the ordinary criminal 
requirement that searches conducted pursuant to a warrant 
must be supported by a reasonable belief that the target of the 
search has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.  See 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) (“Probable cause 
under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and 
circumstances within the affiant‟s knowledge, and of which 
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe 
that an offense has been or is being committed.”); see also 
Appellants‟ Joint Opening Br. 58-59 (citing and quoting 
Berger and Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 
(D. Or. 2007)).
7
  While that requirement certainly applies to 
searches that are conducted solely for law enforcement 
purposes, the Fourth Amendment is more flexible than 
                                                 
7  Defendants‟ argument relies in large part on the analysis in 
Mayfield.  Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated the judgment in that case, see Mayfield v. United 
States, 599 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2010), it is no longer good 
law and we do not address it.   
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defendants‟ argument allows.  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that the standards governing a “warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental interest 
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving 
protection.”  United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 
U.S. 297, 323 (1972). 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]n cases in which 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be 
obtained, „probable cause‟ is the standard by which a 
particular decision to search is tested against the 
constitutional mandate of reasonableness.”  Camara v. Mun. 
Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).  In other words, the critical 
Fourth Amendment requirement, for purposes of this case, is 
that the statutory standard for obtaining a warrant must be 
reasonable.  See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 
122 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The benchmark for judicial review of the 
constitutionality of warrant requirements established by 
Congress is reasonableness . . . .”). 
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What is reasonable, in turn, depends on the nature of 
the search:  “[t]o apply this standard, it is obviously necessary 
first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly 
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected 
interests of the private citizen.”  Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35.  
So, for example, in the criminal context, where the objective 
of a search may be “to recover specific stolen or contraband 
goods,” a warrant to search for such goods “is „reasonable‟ 
only when there is „probable cause‟ to believe that they will 
be uncovered in a particular dwelling.”  Camara, 387 U.S. at 
535.  But in the administrative context, where searches might 
be “aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum 
physical standards for private property,” id. at 535, the 
reasonableness of the warrant “will not necessarily depend 
upon specific knowledge” related to a particular property, id. 
at 539; it may be based, instead, on a judicial determination 
that “the city has adopted a reasonable system of inspections 
and is not targeting citizens for irregular or malicious 
reasons,” United States v. Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 
2006) (describing Camara).   
The government‟s interests in security and intelligence 
are entitled to particular deference.  As the Supreme Court 
has explained, “[w]here . . . the risk against which the 
Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent 
its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable 
searches calculated to advance the Government‟s goal.”  Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75 
(1989).  Thus, the Court has indicated that mandatory, 
suspicionless searches of passengers and luggage at airports 
may be deemed reasonable “„so long as the search is 
conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing 
hijacking or other like damage and with reasonable scope and 
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the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to 
such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel 
by air.‟”  Id. at 675 n.3 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 
498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also United States v. 
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding 
airport checkpoint searches constitutional, in part because 
“there can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on 
airplanes is of paramount importance” and such searches 
“advance the public interest” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the 
reasonableness of the standards set forth in FISA (or of any 
searches conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign 
intelligence), but it has specifically suggested that different 
probable cause standards for intelligence surveillance “may 
be compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”  Keith, 407 U.S. 
at 322.  As in the above examples, the key is whether such 
standards “are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate 
need of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens.”  Id. at 322-23.  Thus, we 
must determine whether FISA‟s “significant purpose” 
standard is reasonable given the government‟s special interest 
in collecting foreign intelligence information.  On that key 
question, we do not write on a blank slate. 
c.  The Fourth Amendment and Foreign 
Intelligence 
Probable cause standards other than the typical 
requirement for belief regarding the commission of a crime 
have been determined to be appropriate and reasonable in the 
foreign intelligence context.  The Supreme Court‟s decision 
in Keith provides a useful starting point in this area.  While 
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discussing the standards that apply to electronic surveillance 
for domestic security purposes, the Court there observed that 
certain “policy and practical considerations” differentiate 
domestic security investigations from ordinary criminal 
investigations:   
 “The gathering of security intelligence is often 
long range and involves the interrelation of 
various sources and types of information.” 
 “The exact targets of such surveillance may be 
more difficult to identify than in surveillance 
operations against many types of crimes . . . .” 
 “Often, . . . the emphasis of domestic 
intelligence gathering is on the prevention of 
unlawful activity or the enhancement of the 
Government‟s preparedness for some possible 
future crisis or emergency.” 
Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.  In sum, “the focus of domestic 
surveillance may be less precise than that directed against 
more conventional types of crime.”  Id.   
In light of these considerations, the Court stated that 
“Congress may wish to consider protective standards” for 
domestic security surveillance warrants that “differ from 
those” prescribed in ordinary criminal cases.  Id.  In 
particular, it suggested that Congress might “judge that the 
application and affidavit showing probable cause” for such 
surveillance “should allege other circumstances more 
appropriate to domestic security cases.”  Id. at 323.  Because 
the same policy and practical considerations highlighted by 
the Keith Court apply equally, or perhaps even to a greater 
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extent, to foreign intelligence gathering, the Court‟s 
comments provide important guideposts for our analysis in 
this case. 
After Keith, several courts of appeals, including our 
own, have examined the Fourth Amendment‟s application to 
electronic surveillance conducted under the guise of the 
President‟s executive authority to collect foreign intelligence 
information.  These courts almost uniformly have concluded 
that the important national interest in foreign intelligence 
gathering justifies electronic surveillance without prior 
judicial review, creating a sort of “foreign intelligence 
exception” to the Fourth Amendment‟s warrant requirement.  
See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 
914 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[B]ecause of the need of the executive 
branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its 
constitutional competence, the courts should not require the 
executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign 
intelligence surveillance.”); United States v. Butenko, 494 
F.3d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (holding, in light of 
the “strong public interest” in uninterrupted foreign 
intelligence collection, that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require “prior judicial authorization” of surveillance 
“conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of 
gathering foreign intelligence information”).  See generally 
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72 (summarizing foreign intelligence 
exception cases).   
Admittedly, FISA changed the landscape by instituting 
a procedure by which the executive branch could seek 
advance judicial review of, and procure a warrant-like order 
for, electronic foreign intelligence surveillance.  Given the 
prevailing pre-FISA conclusion that the executive branch 
could conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
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purposes without a warrant, it was perhaps predictable that 
the courts of appeals that have reviewed FISA, both before 
and since the Patriot Act amendments, all would conclude 
that FISA‟s standards and procedures for authorizing foreign 
intelligence surveillance orders are reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128-29; 
Wen, 477 F.3d at 898-99; United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 
618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 
565, 573 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 
1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Cavanaugh, 807 
F.2d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1987); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74; 
see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.   
d. The Fourth Amendment and the 
“Primary Purpose” Requirement for 
FISA Searches 
Defendants do not ignore all of this history.  Instead, 
they focus on the Patriot Act‟s revision of what is now 50 
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) to require a national security officer 
to certify that “a significant purpose,” rather than “the 
purpose” — which courts had interpreted to mean “the 
primary purpose” — of the surveillance the officer seeks to 
conduct under FISA is “to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.”  They urge that the Patriot Act amendment 
violates the Fourth Amendment by bringing the standard 
below this “primary purpose” threshold.  In fact, however, the 
pre-FISA and pre-Patriot Act amendment foreign intelligence 
cases do not control this case.  Those cases do not establish 
the “primary purpose” requirement as a sine qua non of 
FISA‟s constitutionality, and, even if they did, we would hold 
that application of the reasonableness test set forth above 
counsels a different result. 
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The notion of a “primary purpose” requirement arises 
in pre-FISA foreign intelligence surveillance cases.  
Defendants, understandably, focus on United States v. 
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605-06 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), in 
which our Court held that the executive branch need not 
secure prior judicial authorization for foreign intelligence 
surveillance, but commented in dicta that, “[s]ince the 
primary purpose of these searches is to secure foreign 
intelligence information, a judge, when reviewing a particular 
search [after the fact] must, above all, be assured that this was 
in fact its primary purpose and that the accumulation of 
evidence of criminal activity was incidental.”  That comment 
has little bearing here, however, because it arose out facts 
specific to Butenko, not out of a reasoned analysis of what 
minimum standards would satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
8
  
See id. at 606.   
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has come closer 
to suggesting a link between a “primary purpose” requirement 
and the constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance.  
In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 
1980), it explicitly balanced government and private interests 
under a series of different standards and concluded that “the 
executive should be excused from securing a warrant only 
when the surveillance is conducted „primarily‟ for foreign 
intelligence reasons.”  Id. at 915.  But Truong also does not 
control our analysis.  It involved “the scope of presidential 
                                                 
8
  Specifically, in Butenko, the Attorney General certified, and 
the district court found, that the particular surveillances at 
issue “„were conducted and maintained solely for the purpose 
of gathering foreign intelligence information.‟” 494 F.2d at 
601. 
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authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence 
surveillance.”  Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 121.  Here, we 
consider the constitutionality of a program approved by 
Congress that requires an executive officer to apply to the 
judicial branch for a warrant-like order.  These features 
distinguish our case from Truong in important ways: 
Whatever purpose limits might be 
placed on the president‟s authority 
to conduct warrantless 
surveillance to ensure that the 
exception does not extend beyond 
the constitutional ground for its 
recognition, it does not follow that 
the Fourth Amendment demands 
the same limitation when, as 
under FISA, the powers of all 
three branches of government — 
in short, the whole of federal 
authority — are invoked in 
determining when warrants may 
reasonably be sought and issued 
for the purpose of obtaining 
foreign intelligence information. 
Id.  
FISA cases before the Patriot Act amendments often 
incorporated a “primary purpose” standard without much 
discussion or analysis, typically by assuming, or even 
asserting outright, that it was a statutory requirement.  See, 
e.g., Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572 (affirming district court 
determination that FISA surveillance was lawful in part 
because “it is clear that” the “primary purpose” of the 
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government‟s FISA applications “was to obtain foreign 
intelligence information, not to collect evidence for any 
criminal prosecution of appellants”); Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1075 
(rejecting defendant‟s argument that “FISA surveillance was 
conducted primarily for the purpose of his criminal 
prosecution, and not primarily „for the purpose of obtaining 
foreign intelligence information‟ as required by 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(b)”);9 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77 (“The requirement that 
foreign intelligence information be the primary objective of 
the surveillance is plain not only from the language of 
§ 1802(b) but also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what 
the application must contain.”).  Those cases did not 
expressly link the “primary purpose” standard to an analysis 
of whether FISA satisfies the Fourth Amendment or consider 
whether FISA would be constitutional if it incorporated a 
lower standard instead, which is the question we face now.  
Cf. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727 (concluding that there was 
“not much need” for courts reviewing pre-Patriot Act 
amendment FISA cases to focus on the constitutional 
significance of the “primary purpose” test). 
In all events, we do not believe that the Fourth 
Amendment compels a “primary purpose” test.  The 
dispositive issue is whether the “significant purpose” test is 
reasonable.  Because we conclude that it is for the reasons set 
                                                 
9  50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) provides, in relevant part:  “[A] judge 
to whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any 
other law, grant an order . . . approving electronic 
surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power 
for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence 
information . . . .” (emphasis added). 
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forth below, surveillance based on that standard satisfies the 
Fourth Amendment.   
 e.  The “Significant Purpose” Test Is 
Reasonable 
We agree with our sister courts of appeals and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that 
amended FISA‟s “significant purpose” standard is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, for three reasons. 
First, the “significant purpose” standard reflects a 
balance struck by Congress between “the legitimate need of 
Government for intelligence information” and “the protected 
rights of our citizens.”  Keith, 407 U.S. at 323.  The 
legislative history reveals that “Congress was keenly aware 
that [the Patriot Act‟s amendment to what is now 
§ 1804(a)(6)(B)] relaxed a requirement that the government 
show that its primary purpose was other than criminal 
prosecution.”  Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732.  By adopting the 
amendment, Congress signaled its determination that the new 
standard was needed to promote coordination between 
intelligence and law enforcement officials in combating 
terrorism, acknowledging that, as a practical matter, these 
functions inevitably overlap.
10
  While Congress‟s conclusion 
                                                 
10  Senator Dianne Feinstein explained: 
 
[I]n today‟s world things are not 
so simple.  In many cases, 
surveillance will have two key 
goals—the gathering of foreign 
intelligence, and the gathering of 
evidence for a criminal 
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prosecution.  Determining which 
purpose is the “primary” purpose 
of the investigation can be 
difficult, and will only become 
more so as we coordinate our 
intelligence and law enforcement 
efforts in the war against terror. 
 
Rather than forcing law 
enforcement to decide which 
purpose is primary . . . this bill 
strikes a new balance.  It will now 
require that a “significant” 
purpose of the investigation must 
be foreign intelligence gathering 
to proceed with surveillance under 
FISA. 
 
The effect of this provision will 
be to make it easier for law 
enforcement to obtain a FISA 
search or surveillance warrant for 
those cases where the subject of 
the surveillance is both a potential 
source of valuable intelligence 
and the potential target of a 
criminal prosecution.  Many of 
the individuals involved in 
supporting the September 11 
attacks may well fall into both of 
those categories. 
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in that regard of course is not dispositive, nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court in Keith suggested that “congressional 
judgment” has an important role to play in weighing 
government interests and determining reasonable “protective 
standards” related to intelligence.  Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23.  
We therefore view Congress‟s actions in this area with some 
additional measure of deference. 
Second, even leaving Congress‟s judgment aside, we 
conclude that FISA‟s “significant purpose” standard is 
reasonable in light of the government‟s legitimate national 
security goals.  We are mindful of the high stakes involved 
and emphasize the Supreme Court‟s admonition that 
“[w]here, as here, the possible harm against which the 
Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent 
its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable 
searches calculated to advance the Government‟s goal.”  Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 674-75; see also id. at 675 n.3 (approving 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals‟ conclusion that “„[w]hen 
the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in pirating or blowing 
up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of 
reasonableness so long as the search is conducted in good 
faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking‟” and other 
safeguards are in place (quoting Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500)).   
Replacing the “primary purpose” standard with a 
“significant purpose” test reasonably furthers the 
government‟s national security goals.  As other courts, and 
Congress, have observed, the status quo ante proved difficult 
to administer — in complex national security investigations, 
                                                                                                             
147 Cong. Rec. S10,591 (Oct. 11, 2001), quoted in Sealed 
Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33. 
31 
 
it was often difficult to say whether intelligence or law 
enforcement, or neither of them, was the “primary” 
objective — and resulted in a rigid, artificial separation 
between intelligence and law enforcement investigations that 
prevented cooperation and, ultimately, “imposed a cost on 
national security.”  Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 124-25; see also 
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33, 743-44 & nn.27-29.   
The “significant purpose” standard, which reflects a 
“negotiated compromise” between those in Congress who 
wished to keep the law the same and officials in the executive 
branch, “who wished to virtually eliminate the foreign 
intelligence standard,” 147 Cong. Rec. S10,591 (Oct. 11, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also Abu-
Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 125-26; Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732, 
alleviates those practical concerns by doing away with the 
problematic “primary purpose” test.  It also retains key 
protections for individuals.  In particular, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has held that the 
statute, as amended, “require[s] „that the government have a 
measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just 
criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes‟” and 
“„excludes from the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence 
information a sole objective of criminal prosecution,‟ even for 
foreign intelligence crimes.”  Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128 
(quoting Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735); see also Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d at 736 (“[T]he FISA process cannot be used as a 
device to investigate wholly [non-foreign-intelligence related] 
ordinary crimes.”). 
Finally, and importantly, FISA contains significant 
procedural safeguards against abuse.  As amended, FISA 
requires a senior government official (typically the Director 
of the FBI, see Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736) to certify that 
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“obtaining foreign intelligence information . . . is a bona fide 
purpose of the surveillance” and the Attorney General (or a 
senior-level designee, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(g)) to approve 
each FISA application.  Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 127.  That 
senior Justice Department officials must approve every FISA 
application gives us additional comfort that this process does 
not provide an end run around the more stringent Fourth 
Amendment standards that apply in ordinary criminal cases.   
The statute also provides for appropriate, albeit 
limited, judicial review.  An Article III judge sitting on the 
FISA court reviews every application, makes particularized 
findings concerning the application‟s compliance with the 
statute‟s requirements, and issues an order specifying the 
parameters of the government‟s surveillance authority.  See 
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a), (c).  The FISA judge may demand 
“further inquiry into the certifying officer‟s purpose — or 
perhaps even the Attorney General‟s or Deputy Attorney 
General‟s reasons for approval” of the application, and should 
deny the application if he or she “conclude[s] that the 
government‟s sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence of 
past criminal conduct — even foreign intelligence crimes — 
to punish the agent rather than halt ongoing espionage or 
terrorist activity.”  Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735-36.  These 
safeguards confirm that FISA‟s “significant purpose” 
standard is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   
f.  Evidence Derived from a Reasonable 
Search Is Admissible in a Criminal 
Trial 
Underlying defendants‟ argument that FISA‟s 
“significant purpose” test is unconstitutional is the notion that 
the government should not be allowed to introduce in a 
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criminal prosecution evidence not gathered in compliance 
with the minimum procedural requirements the Fourth 
Amendment typically imposes on criminal investigations.  
While that notion may be appealing, it does not reflect the 
law.  Instead, it is clear that the government may use evidence 
derived from non-law-enforcement searches (i.e., searches not 
based on a reasonable belief regarding the commission of a 
crime) that otherwise satisfy the Fourth Amendment‟s 
reasonableness requirement to prosecute crimes.  Thus, in the 
administrative context, “[i]nspectors lawfully on the 
premises . . . may report any violations of law that they find.”  
Wen, 477 F.3d at 898.  Likewise, the government may 
prosecute a defendant for possession of drugs uncovered in 
the course of a routine airport search.  See Hartwell, 436 F.3d 
at 181; see also id. at 181 n.13 (“[T]he fruits of the search 
need not be suppressed so long as the search itself was 
permissible.”). 
Here, we have concluded that searches in the form of 
surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA‟s “significant 
purpose” requirement are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, we join other courts of appeals in 
holding that evidence derived from duly authorized FISA 
surveillance is admissible in a criminal case.  See Wen, 477 
F.3d at 898 (holding that if, in the course of conducting FISA-
authorized surveillance, “agents discover evidence of a 
domestic crime, they may use it to prosecute for that offense,” 
even if the agents knew or “may have known” when they 
applied for the FISA order “that they were likely to hear 
evidence of domestic crime”); see also Duggan, 743 F.2d at 
78 (noting that “otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not 
tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the 
fruits of such surveillance may later be used, as allowed by 
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[50 U.S.C.] § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial” and 
holding that “the fact that domestic law enforcement concerns 
may also have been implicated” in government‟s decision to 
seek a FISA order “did not eliminate the government‟s ability 
to obtain a valid FISA order”). 
2.  Defendants Are Not Entitled to Relief 
Because the FISA Searches Were 
Conducted in Reasonable Reliance on a 
Statute 
We are confident that FISA‟s “significant purpose” 
test satisfies the Fourth Amendment.  But even if we were 
not, we still would not overturn defendants‟ convictions based 
on the government‟s use of FISA-derived evidence at trial.  
Supreme Court precedent makes abundantly clear that, even if 
we were to conclude that amended FISA is unconstitutional, 
evidence derived from it would nevertheless have been 
admissible in the government‟s case. 
Defendants‟ argument for reversal depends in part on 
the theory that, if FISA violates the Fourth Amendment, 
FISA-derived evidence automatically must have been 
excluded.
11
  See, e.g., Appellants‟ Joint Opening Br. 53 (“By 
                                                 
11
  Defendants‟ theory also depends on the notion that, absent 
the FISA-derived evidence, the government would not have 
been able to secure their convictions.  See, e.g., Appellants‟ 
Joint Opening Br. 53 (asserting that, if FISA-derived 
evidence were excluded, “no evidence would be admissible to 
prove the elements of the crimes charged and Appellants 
could not be convicted of the charges”).  We do not reach this 
aspect of defendants‟ argument, but, in light of the de minimis 
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holding FISA as amended by the Patriot Act unconstitutional 
the evidence used will be illegally obtained and prohibited to 
be used in trial against the Appellants.”).  But that is not 
necessarily so.  See United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 
151 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] determination that the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated does not necessarily require 
application of the exclusionary rule.”).  The exclusionary rule 
precludes the admission of evidence tainted by a Fourth 
Amendment violation “only in those unusual cases in which 
exclusion will further the purposes of the . . . rule.”  United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984).  Because the rule 
“is designed to deter police misconduct,” id. at 916, it applies 
only where it will “alter the behavior of individual law 
enforcement officers or the policies of their departments,” id. 
at 918.   
The Supreme Court has ruled categorically that 
“suppress[ing] evidence obtained by an officer acting in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute” would not further 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule, even if that statute is 
later declared unconstitutional.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340, 349-50 (1987).  Therefore, even a defendant who can 
establish that evidence against him or her was procured under 
a statute that violates the Fourth Amendment is not entitled to 
have such evidence excluded from his or her criminal trial 
unless he or she can establish that the officer‟s reliance on the 
statute was not objectively reasonable.  Cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 
368 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that, “under [the 
Court‟s] decision today, no effective remedy is to be provided 
                                                                                                             
nature and quantity of the FISA-derived evidence, see supra 
n.4, we doubt seriously that would be the case. 
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in the very case in which the statute at issue was held 
unconstitutional”). 
The FISA amendment defendants challenge was duly 
enacted by Congress through the Patriot Act, and defendants 
have not argued on appeal that government officials did not 
reasonably rely on amended FISA in seeking the surveillance 
orders at issue in this case.
12
  Thus, under Krull, the 
exclusionary rule plainly does not apply, and, even if we 
agreed with defendants that the “significant purpose” test is 
unconstitutional, we would be powerless to overturn their 
convictions on that ground. 
B.  Statements Made “In Furtherance” of the 
Conspiracy 
Serdar Tatar argues that the District Court improperly 
admitted under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay 
rule two sets of statements made by Dritan and Shain Duka 
about him.  Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides, 
in relevant part, that “a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” 
is not hearsay.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  Tatar argues that 
                                                 
12
  The objective reasonableness of the officers‟ reliance on 
the statute in this case is further bolstered by the fact that the 
particular provision at issue has been reviewed and declared 
constitutional by several courts, going as far back as 2002.  
See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746; see also Abu-Jihaad, 630 
F.3d at 128-29; Wen, 477 F.3d at 898-99; Damrah, 412 F.3d 
at 625; cf. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 
(2011) (holding that “when the police conduct a search in 
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate 
precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply”).   
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the District Court erred in finding that the relevant statements 
were made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy.  We hold that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 
first set of statements.  Although it abused its discretion in 
admitting the second set of challenged statements, its error 
was harmless in light of the other evidence of Tatar‟s 
participation in the conspiracy to kill United States military 
personnel, the only offense of which he was convicted. 
1.  The Challenged Statements and the  
District Court’s Rulings 
The first set of statements comes from an audio 
recording of a conversation among Dritan Duka, Shain Duka, 
and confidential informant Besnik Bakalli.  Dritan said that 
Tatar “wanted to join the military in America” and “wanted to 
kill them from inside.”  (Joint App. 2789.)  He told Bakalli 
that Tatar “was very serious, just to get in and kill them” and 
that he was “a maniac, he sees [UI] like we aren‟t human by 
watching Muslims get killed everyday [UI].”13 (Id.)  Later, he 
said that, when Tatar sought to join the U.S. military, “[t]hat 
was the only thing on his mind that he kill American soldiers” 
(Joint App. 2791).  Shain Duka said, “[Tatar]‟s not totally all 
there, like you‟re supposed to be” and that Tatar was “very 
funny but he‟s not serious.”  (Joint App. 2789.)   
The District Court accepted the government‟s 
argument that these statements were made in furtherance of 
the conspiracy because the Dukas wanted to show Bakalli that 
they were serious, to keep Bakalli in the conspiracy, and “to 
buck him up.”  (Joint App. 950.)  After discussing other 
evidence in the record (including Tatar‟s own admissions) 
                                                 
13  [UI] denotes unintelligible words in the recordings. 
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concerning Tatar‟s attempts to join the military, the District 
Court concluded that these statements were akin to a “present 
sense assurance to Mr. Bakalli that this is a serious matter.  
We‟ve got these people lined up who are going to do serious 
things and I mean and look at Serdar, he‟s so serious about 
this, he wanted to join the military to get on the inside.”  
(Joint App. 951.)  
The second set of statements occurred later in the same 
conversation, when Shain Duka was discussing “our group.”  
Shain said, “our group was this Sayed, that boy, the Turk, 
Serdani [i.e., Tatar], me, Dritoni [i.e., Dritan], Sulemaini [i.e., 
Eljvir] . . .” and that, “[b]etween the six of us that hung out 
together, there was no motherf***** that could f*** with us.  
Everybody feared us, We were bad.  Heading on the wrong 
path.”  (Joint App. 2795-96.)  The District Court originally 
expressed some reluctance to admit these statements, saying, 
“I don‟t know what the context of that conversation . . . is to 
be honest,” but ultimately concluded that the statements were 
admissible because they were “talking about an association 
that apparently the Government contends continued through 
the length of the conspiracy.  It shows that they‟ve been 
together as a group for some time.”  (Joint App. 949.) 
 2.  Rule 801(d)(2)(E) Analysis 
“„We review a District Court‟s decision to admit or 
exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, although our review 
is plenary as to the district court‟s interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.‟”  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 
312, 337 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
497 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
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As a threshold matter, we reject Tatar‟s argument, 
made in passing, that the statements do not qualify under the 
Rule because they were made to a government informant, 
“not . . . an alleged coconspirator,” Appellants‟ Joint Opening 
Br. 92, because no blanket rule forbids the admission of 
coconspirator statements made to informants.  Where 
coconspirators‟ statements have been made to government 
informants and were intended to keep others “abreast of 
developments and allay any fear they might have had,” we 
have held that they satisfy the “in furtherance of the 
conspiracy” requirement.  United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 
838, 840 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 173-74, 184 (1987) (affirming court of appeals‟ 
determination that telephone conversations between 
defendant‟s coconspirator and FBI informant were made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and admissible under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E)).  As far as Dritan and Shain Duka were 
concerned, Bakalli was involved in the conspiracy.  
Therefore, as long as the statements satisfy the other 
requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), i.e., they were made 
“during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy,” they 
are admissible. 
Tatar‟s challenge focuses on whether the statements 
satisfy the “in furtherance” requirement.  We have previously 
explained that “„[s]tatements between conspirators which 
provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness 
among them, or inform each other of the current status of the 
conspiracy‟” satisfy that requirement “„and are admissible so 
long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are 
met.‟”  United States v. Weaver, 507 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 
(3d Cir. 1983)).  The threshold for establishing that a 
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statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy is not 
high:  “„[t]he in furtherance requirement is usually given a 
broad interpretation.‟”  Id. at 183 (quoting Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 
845).   
Applying these standards, we cannot say the District 
Court abused its discretion in concluding that the first set of 
challenged statements was made “in furtherance” of 
defendants‟ conspiracy.  The District Court found that, in the 
context of the overall conversation, the first set of statements 
was intended to reassure Bakalli and maintain trust within the 
conspiracy by illustrating for Bakalli the seriousness of the 
conspirators‟ intent.  Its analysis in that regard is reasonable, 
and Tatar has not pointed to any specific dialogue or evidence 
that would undermine the District Court‟s conclusion.   
The second set of statements is more problematic.  The 
District Court reasoned that the statements were evidence of 
the Dukas‟ association with Tatar, but did not make any 
finding regarding how those statements furthered the 
conspiracy.  The government offers a couple of arguments as 
to how these statements could be viewed as “in furtherance 
of” the conspiracy — “Shain‟s statements about the long 
duration and comradely nature of his and his brother‟s 
association with Tatar, dating to when they were high school 
students together, were designed to show Bakalli that . . . 
Dritan and Shain had a well-grounded and reliable 
understanding of Tatar‟s proclivities, and thus could be 
counted on to accurately predict how far Tatar would be 
willing to go to advance the lethal goals of the conspiracy,” 
and “Even if Dritan and Shain were not then actively 
recruiting Bekalli [sic] into the conspiracy, the statements 
furthered the conspiracy by tacitly warning Bekalli [sic] not 
to expose it.”  Consol. Br. for Appellee 124-25.  We do not 
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find either of those explanations convincing, especially 
because, as the District Court observed, the transcript 
provides no broader context for that portion of the 
conversation.  (Joint App. 949.)  Moreover, in our view, the 
relevance of the second set of statements was tenuous at best, 
and, in all events was clearly outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice inherent in the suggestion of Tatar‟s close 
association with the other defendants.  See Fed. R. Evid. 403 
(“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 
prejudice.”).  We therefore conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in admitting them. 
Given our deferential standard of review, however, we 
must conclude that the District Court‟s abuse of discretion 
was harmless in the context of this trial.  As we discuss 
below, the admission of the second set of statements does not 
undermine confidence in the verdict against Tatar.  See 
United States v. Zerhbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc) (“An appellate court should not exercise its 
„supervisory power to reverse a conviction . . . when the error 
to which it is addressed is harmless, since, by definition, the 
conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the 
asserted error.‟” (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 
499, 508-09 (1983))).  We also observe that Tatar has not 
argued on appeal that those statements were inadmissible 
under Rule 403. 
3.  Harmless Error 
“An error in an evidentiary ruling is harmless . . . when 
„it is highly probable that the error did not affect the result.‟”  
United States v. Friedman, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 4470674, at 
*7 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting Hill v. Laeisz, 435 F.3d 
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404, 420 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “High probability means that we 
have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendants.”  United States v. Casseus, 282 F.3d 253, 256 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  That is the 
case here, where evidence other than the challenged 
statements amply supports Tatar‟s sole conviction for 
conspiracy to murder United States military personnel.  More 
specifically, the government established, through evidence 
Tatar does not challenge on appeal, that Tatar participated in 
the conspiracy with the other defendants, i.e., that he “knew 
of the agreement and intended both to join it and to 
accomplish its illegal objects.”  United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2007).   
Tatar knew of the agreement.  Tatar appeared in the 
video that the FBI discovered of defendants at the shooting 
range in the Poconos.  He discussed violent jihad with the 
other defendants and gathered with them to listen to and 
discuss Anwar al-Awlaki‟s Constants on the Path of Jihad, a 
lecture advocating violent jihad.  (See Joint App. 979, 989, 
2749-52, 2784-85.)  In a recorded conversation with 
government informant Omar, Tatar agreed to provide Omar 
with a map of Fort Dix after Omar explained that he needed 
the map as part of his plan to make “this country . . . pay the 
price for something they did to me.”  (Joint App. 2098-99.)  
Tatar understood and acknowledged the gravity of what Omar 
proposed:  in a subsequent conversation, Tatar specifically 
asked Omar, “[W]hat are you thinking of doing?”  (Joint App. 
2123.)  After Omar responded by describing his surveillance 
of Fort Dix with Shnewer, Tatar said, “This is nothing small.”  
(Joint App. 2124.)  In addition to this evidence, the 
government also introduced the transcript of a recorded 
conversation between Shnewer and Omar, the admission of 
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which Tatar has not challenged on appeal, in which Omar told 
Shnewer that Tatar was aware that Omar and Shnewer had 
made “a plan on the basis that, in the future, we‟ll make an 
attack on Fort Dix.”  (Supp. App. 88-89.)   
Tatar intended both to join the conspiracy and to 
accomplish its illegal objects.  Tatar plainly understood the 
implications of providing Omar and Shnewer with the map of 
Fort Dix.  At one point, he said to Omar, “I‟m getting 
involved in it, you understand?  I‟m getting involved in it by 
giving you the maps.”  (Joint App. 2123.)  In a conversation 
discussing the planned attack on Fort Dix, Tatar also told 
Omar, “I‟m in, honestly, I‟m in.”  (Joint App. 2114.)  Finally, 
Tatar expressed his decision to join the group in unequivocal 
terms, saying:   
I‟m gonna do it. . . . I‟m gonna 
give it to you. . . . It doesn‟t 
matter to me, whether I get locked 
up, arrested, or they take me 
away, it doesn‟t matter.  Whether 
I die, don‟t matter, I‟m doing it in 
the name of Allah. 
(Joint App. 2135.)  Omar testified at trial that, after all of this 
discussion, Tatar actually gave him the Fort Dix map, 
confirming that he intended to help Omar and Shnewer carry 
out their attack.  (Joint App. 477-78.)   
Given this direct evidence of Tatar‟s participation in 
the conspiracy, we do not view the admission of the 
challenged statements concerning Tatar‟s attempts to join the 
military to attack it from the inside, or his long association 
with the Duka brothers, as significant.  We note, further, that 
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the admitted statements were mostly cumulative of other 
evidence:  the video from the Poconos and numerous 
recorded conversations established that Tatar socialized with 
the other defendants, and Dritan Duka‟s challenged statement 
was not the only evidence that Tatar had tried to attack U.S. 
institutions from “the inside” — in a recorded conversation, 
Tatar suggested to Omar that “you could do it from the 
inside” and said that he had attempted to become a police 
officer in California for precisely that reason.  (Joint App. 
2139.)  Therefore, we will not reverse Tatar‟s conviction 
based on the District Court‟s admission of the challenged 
coconspirator statements. 
C.  Other Issues 
In addition to the challenges discussed in detail above, 
defendants raised numerous other challenges to their 
convictions and sentences in their consolidated, counseled 
brief and in individual briefs we permitted them to file pro se.  
Those challenges relate to:  
 the District Court‟s admission of jihadist 
videos, certain audio recordings, coconspirator 
statements made by Shnewer, and evidence 
seized from Tatar‟s apartment;  
 whether the prosecution constructively amended 
the indictment or violated defendants‟ Fifth 
Amendment rights during its closing argument;  
 whether the District Court erred in failing sua 
sponte to strike a juror whose son was wounded 
in combat in Iraq but who stated during voir 
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dire that her son‟s experience would not affect 
her judgment;  
 whether the prosecution improperly took 
inconsistent positions concerning the 
relationship between the Duka brothers and 
government informant Omar; 
 the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
conspiracy charges against Eljvir Duka and 
Serdar Tatar;  
 the District Court‟s application of 
enhancements for terrorism and for targeting 
“official victims” to defendants‟ sentences and 
its failure to consider the role of the government 
informants when determining defendants‟ 
sentences;  
 the District Court‟s denial of defendants‟ fifth 
request for a continuance of trial;  
 the restitution portion of Shnewer‟s sentence; 
 jury instructions;  
 ineffective assistance of counsel; and 
 whether, even assuming each of defendants‟ 
challenges fails individually, all of the legal, 
factual, and procedural errors they have raised 
cumulatively deprived defendants of their right 
to a fair trial.   
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None of the evidentiary issues rises to the level of 
reversible error.  The most significant challenge is made to 
the District Court‟s decision to admit videos of beheadings 
that defendants viewed and discussed at length as part of their 
overall preparations for jihad.  Defendants argue that the 
District Court abused its discretion in admitting the videos 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because they were 
unduly prejudicial and lacked any probative value relative to 
the charges.
14
  We disagree.  The District Court carefully 
considered the parties‟ arguments; determined that the video 
evidence “explains or could explain if the jury accepts it, I 
should say, why the defendants would do what they‟re 
charged with doing” (Supp. App. 807); and required the 
government to “sanitize” the videos, replacing the actual 
beheadings with a “rather antiseptic description of what 
happens” to be delivered by a government witness at trial 
(Supp. App. 809).  Based on the foregoing, the District Court 
could not “conclude that the probative value” of the redacted 
videos “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair . . 
. prejudice in this case.”  (Id.)   
After reviewing the videos and the testimony that 
accompanied them at trial, we conclude that the District Court 
reasonably assessed the videos‟ relevance and probative value 
and took appropriate steps to mitigate their prejudicial 
                                                 
14
  Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides, in relevant part:  
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice . . . .”   
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impact.
15
  We discern no error in the District Court‟s 
approach.  Cf. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 133-34 (identifying 
“no error, let alone arbitrary or irrational error,” in the district 
court‟s decision to admit violent, pro-jihadist videos to show 
defendant‟s “motive and intent” in participating in a scheme 
to communicate information to be used in the destruction of a 
U.S. military ship where danger of prejudice was minimized 
by redactions and limiting instructions).   
The District Court approached each of the evidentiary 
issues before us on appeal with the same thoroughness and 
thoughtfulness it employed in analyzing the beheading 
videos.  We find no abuse of discretion with respect to any of 
those issues and commend Judge Kugler for his handling of 
this lengthy and complicated trial. 
We also reject defendants‟ argument that the 
prosecution constructively amended the indictment during the 
rebuttal portion of its closing remarks.  Specifically, 
defendants urge that the prosecutor‟s assertion that “[i]t 
doesn‟t matter if the object of the conspiracy was to kill a 
soldier in Delaware, or in Pennsylvania, or in Iraq or 
Afghanistan” impermissibly broadened the superseding 
indictment which, they contend, charged only a conspiracy to 
                                                 
15
  The District Court spoke only in terms of the videos‟ 
“relevance” under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and did not 
separately analyze their “probative value” under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403.  But we do not view that as an error, let 
alone a reversible error, here, where the videos‟ probative 
value — providing the jury with insights into defendants‟ 
state of mind by allowing it to view videos that defendants 
viewed to prepare for their planned attack — was closely tied 
to their relevance. 
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attack military personnel at specified bases in New Jersey, 
Delaware, or Pennsylvania.  Defendants did not raise this 
issue in the District Court, so our review is only for plain 
error.  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
“„An indictment is constructively amended when, in 
the absence of a formal amendment, the evidence and jury 
instructions at trial modify essential terms of the charged 
offense in such a way that there is substantial likelihood that 
the jury may have convicted the defendant for an offense 
differing from the offense the indictment returned by the 
grand jury actually charged.‟”  Id. at 532 (quoting United 
States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006)).  That 
is not what happened here, because the challenged remarks 
did not refer to an element or “essential term” of the charged 
offense.  The statutes under which defendants‟ conspiracy 
charge arose, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1117 and 1114, do not even refer 
to the place where the defendant intends to kill the federal 
employee, i.e., whether at a particular base in New Jersey or 
somewhere in Afghanistan, let alone define it as an element 
of the conspiracy or the underlying substantive offense.
16
 
                                                 
16
  18 U.S.C. § 1117, “conspiracy to murder,” provides: 
 
If two or more persons conspire to 
violate section 1111, 1114, 1116, 
or 1119 of this title, and one or 
more of such persons do any overt 
act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be 
punished by imprisonment for any 
term of years or for life.   
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At most, then, the prosecutor‟s comments reflected a 
“variance” from the indictment.  See United States v. McKee, 
506 F.3d 225, 231 n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing 
constructive amendments from variances); see also Vosburgh, 
602 F.3d at 532 n.20 (same).  Unlike a constructive 
amendment, a variance is a reversible error only where the 
defendant establishes “„that the variance prejudiced some 
substantial right.‟”  Id. at 532 (quoting Daraio, 445 F.3d at 
262).  “A variance that sufficiently informs the defendant of 
the charges against him and allows him to prepare his defense 
without being misled or surprised at trial does not prejudice 
the defendant‟s substantial rights.”  Id.  Here, defendants have 
not argued that the prosecutor‟s comment surprised them or 
                                                                                                             
 
18 U.S.C. § 1114, “protection of officers and employees of 
the United States,” sets forth the punishment for: 
 
Whoever kills or attempts to kill 
any officer or employee of the 
United States or of any agency in 
any branch of the United States 
Government (including any 
member of the uniformed 
services) while such officer or 
employee is engaged in or on 
account of the performance of 
official duties, or any person 
assisting such an officer or 
employee in the performance of 
such duties or on account of that 
assistance. 
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otherwise prevented them from presenting their case at trial in 
any way.  Accordingly, their argument that the prosecutor‟s 
comment constitutes reversible error must fail.
17
 
Having thoroughly reviewed each of the other issues 
presented in defendants‟ myriad briefs, we conclude that they 
lack merit.
18
 
D.  The Attempted Possession Counts 
One week before oral argument in this case, the 
government informed us in a letter that it had discovered a 
legal error in the superseding indictment that was tried to the 
jury:  Count 3, against Dritan and Shain Duka,
19
 and Count 4, 
                                                 
17
  Although we analyze this issue as a variance, not a 
constructive amendment, we note that defendants‟ 
constructive amendment challenge would likely also fail on 
its own terms because ample evidence supported defendants‟ 
convictions of conspiracy to attack military bases in New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, particularly the United 
States Army Base at Fort Dix.  See Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 532 
(“If a defendant is convicted of the same offense that was 
charged in the indictment, there is no constructive 
amendment.”). 
 
18
  In particular, we note that we ordinarily do not address 
ineffective-assistance arguments on direct appeal, especially 
where, as here, the factual basis for the claims is not well 
developed.  See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-
72 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
19
  Eljvir Duka also was charged in Count 3, but was acquitted 
of that count. 
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against Mohamed Shnewer, each charged a non-existent 
crime, namely, attempted possession of firearms in 
furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A).
20
  The government explained that, because 
§ 924(c) does not contain an explicit attempt provision and 
there is no general federal attempt statute, “attempted 
possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)” is not a legally 
cognizable crime.   
The government also has informed us that it will not 
defend Shnewer‟s Count 4 conviction, as the indictment and 
verdict slip framed Count 4 solely as an attempt offense.  
Accordingly, we will vacate Shnewer‟s conviction and 
sentence for Count 4 and remand so that the District Court 
can dismiss Count 4 and remove (or refund) the associated 
$100 special assessment. 
At the same time, the government urges us to affirm 
the convictions of Dritan and Shain Duka on Count 3.  That 
count differs from Count 4 because the indictment charged 
possession or attempted possession of seven specific firearms 
in furtherance of a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1)(A), 
                                                                                                             
 
20
  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part:  
“[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person 
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or 
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 
possesses a firearm, shall” be subject to a mandatory 
minimum sentence of imprisonment set forth in the statute “in 
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of 
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . .” 
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and therefore contained both valid and invalid theories of 
liability.  The government argues that any charging error on 
that count was not plain and, in all events, was harmless 
under Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam), 
because its theory against Dritan and Shain on Count 3 at trial 
was that they actually possessed the seven specified firearms 
and the evidence established beyond any doubt that Dritan 
and Shain actually possessed those guns.
21
  Dritan and Shain 
argue that we must vacate their convictions on Count 4 
because the jury may have relied on the invalid attempt 
theory. 
                                                 
21
  The government initially argued that defendants waived 
their rights to challenge their convictions on Counts 3 and 4 
by failing to identify this issue in their opening briefs, but it 
appears to have abandoned this argument in its subsequent 
letter brief.  In all events, we consider the possibility that 
defendants may have been convicted of a crime that does not 
exist to be an “extraordinary circumstance” that warrants 
review.  Cf. United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195-96 
(3d Cir. 2011) (reviewing merits of challenge that may 
otherwise have been waived where (1) government would not 
be prejudiced because it had an opportunity to present 
briefing on the challenge and “failed to pursue meaningfully 
its waiver argument” in that briefing and (2) failure to 
consider challenge may have affected the fairness of the 
judicial proceedings); see also United States v. Tann, 577 
F.3d 533, 542-43 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that, under Ball v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985), and Rutledge v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996), improper conviction affected 
defendant‟s substantial rights). 
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We first consider what standard applies to our review 
of this issue.  The Supreme Court made clear in Pulido that 
questions involving juries that are “instructed on multiple 
theories of liability, one of which is improper,” are “trial 
errors subject to harmless-error review.”22  555 U.S. at 60-61.  
Dritan and Shain argue that their convictions on Count 4 were 
not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have convicted them absent the attempt 
theory.  See United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“An error is harmless when it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.” (quoting Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
The government argues that, because Dritan and Shain 
failed to raise this issue in the District Court, the more 
stringent plain-error standard applies.  We agree.  Defense 
counsel certainly should have brought to the District Court‟s 
attention the fact that the indictment charged their clients with 
a non-existent crime.  Moreover, as a legal matter, Pulido 
holds that alternative-theory errors are “trial errors,” not 
“structural errors.”  555 U.S. at 60-61.  Accordingly, they are 
not subject to the “structural error” exception to the plain-
error rule.  See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 
2164-65 (2010).  Where, as here, an issue was not raised in 
the district court, we are not aware of any other basis for 
                                                 
22
  Pulido was a habeas case, but the Court later confirmed 
that harmless-error analysis is to be conducted in direct-
appeal cases (like this one) as well as those on collateral 
review.  See United States v. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2934 
n.46 (2010).   
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avoiding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)‟s plain-
error rule.   
Review for plain error proceeds in four steps, with the 
burden placed on defendants.  We must determine whether 
Dritan and Shain have demonstrated that:   
(1) there is an error; (2) the error 
is clear or obvious, rather than 
subject to reasonable dispute; (3) 
the error affected the appellant‟s 
substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means it affected 
the outcome of the district court 
proceedings; and (4) the error 
seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. 
Id. at 2164 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
The government has conceded an error that is clear — 
the first two prongs of the analysis — by admitting that the 
indictment charged Dritan and Shain with an “attempt” crime 
that does not exist.  This point appears to be well taken, as 
several statements from other courts support the proposition 
that an attempt to violate § 924(c)(1)(A) is not a legally 
cognizable offense.  See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 525 
F.3d 225, 251 (2d Cir. 2008) (because there is no general 
federal attempt statute, “an attempt to commit criminal 
conduct „is . . . actionable only where . . . a specific criminal 
statute makes impermissible its attempted as well as actual 
violation‟” (second omission and emphasis in original)); 
United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1309, 1314 (6th Cir. 1996) 
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(“§ 924(c), among other things, makes it a crime to use or 
carry a firearm during a drug trafficking offense; it does not 
specifically criminalize an attempt to use or carry a firearm 
during such an offense.” (citations omitted)).  See generally 
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(“Federal criminal law is purely statutory; there is no federal 
common law of crimes.”). 
Thus, we turn to the third prong, whether the error 
affected Dritan and Shain‟s “substantial rights,” i.e., whether 
it “affected the outcome of the district court‟s proceedings.”  
Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  We agree with the government that it did 
not because the evidence at trial clearly established Dritan 
and Shain Duka‟s actual, as opposed to attempted, possession 
of the firearms at issue in Count 3.   
In contrast with the allegations in Count 4 that 
Shnewer only “attempt[ed] to possess” an unspecified “AK-
47 machinegun and/or semiautomatic assault weapon,”, 
Count 3 of the superseding indictment charged Dritan and 
Shain Duka with “possess[ing] or attempt[ing] to possess” 
seven particular firearms, each identified by make, model, 
and serial number.  The government entered each of the 
specified firearms into evidence, along with testimony from a 
law enforcement officer that he placed those weapons in the 
apartment of confidential informant Mahmoud Omar on the 
evening of May 7, 2007.  (Joint App. 233-34.)  Omar‟s 
eyewitness testimony, and audio and video recordings from 
FBI surveillance equipment installed in Omar‟s apartment, 
established that, on May 7, 2007, Dritan and Shain Duka 
came to Omar‟s apartment, handed over $1,400 in cash to 
Omar, and took possession of the seven weapons.  Federal 
and state law enforcement agents arrested Dritan and Shain 
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inside Omar‟s apartment that evening as they prepared to take 
the guns out to their car.  (Joint App. 238.)  The government‟s 
sole argument to the jury on Count 3 against Dritan and Shain 
was that the “May 7th recording” provided “overwhelming 
evidence” that they actually possessed the relevant firearms.23  
(Joint App. 1282.) 
We acknowledge that the jury instructions did not 
clearly distinguish between the attempt and actual possession 
theories of liability (see Joint App. 1250-51) and the verdict 
slip allowed the jury to convict Dritan and Shain on Count 3 
if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that they “possessed or 
attempted to possess” firearms in furtherance of the 
conspiracy and attempt offenses charged in Counts 1 and 2 of 
the indictment.  But we conclude in light of the evidence and 
the way the government argued the case to the jury that there 
is no reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Dritan and 
Shain of the unlawful attempt, as opposed to the proper actual 
possession, offense.   
                                                 
23
  In this regard, the government‟s argument against Dritan 
and Shain on Count 3 contrasts sharply with its argument 
against Eljvir Duka on Count 3, which relied on a 
coconspirator theory (see Joint App. 1282-83 (“Eljvir Duka 
clearly was not at the May 7th deal.  But by then it‟s certainly 
foreseeable to him that his coconspirators, Dritan and Shain 
Duka would be getting guns.”)), and its argument against 
Shnewer on Count 4, which was based on a pure attempt 
theory (see Joint App. 1283 (citing evidence “where 
Mohamed Shnewer makes numerous efforts to acquire the 
guns from Omar and says he‟s got the money ready” as 
proving Count 4 “beyond a reasonable doubt”)).   
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Dritan‟s and Shain‟s arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive.  They rely on other evidence concerning their 
attempts to acquire weapons before the May 2007 transaction 
and the prosecution‟s comments on that evidence during its 
summation.  But that evidence does not speak to the seven 
specific weapons identified in Count 3 of the indictment, and 
the prosecution only used it to bolster its argument that 
defendants were serious about attacking the military.  The 
evidence concerning the Dukas‟ previous attempts to obtain 
firearms does not negate the extensive, direct evidence of the 
May 7th transaction or the fact that the prosecution clearly 
focused on Dritan‟s and Shain‟s actual possession of weapons 
on May 7th as its sole theory of liability against them on 
Count 3. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse Shnewer‟s 
conviction on Count 4.  We will vacate the 360-month 
consecutive sentence imposed for that count and remand for 
the limited purpose of dismissing that count and removing the 
associated $100 special assessment.  As to all of the other 
counts, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court. 
